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NOTES 
Widows' Allowances and Marital Deductions-The 
Date-of-Death Rule 
In every state there are statutes that provide for widows' allow-
ances in an attempt to assure adequate support for widows during 
the time it takes to settle their husbands' estates.1 A common feature 
in most of these state support statutes is that the local probate judge 
is permitted to order an amount which the court finds to be reason-
ably necessary for the maintenance of the widow during the period 
of settlement to be set aside for her from the rest of the estate.2 The 
maximum amount permitted, the method of payment, the duration 
of the allowance, the extent to which the probate court may later 
modify the award, and the factors to be considered in the initial 
determination of the award differ greatly from state to state.8 In 
addition, only a few statutes and a limited number of cases have 
dealt with the question of when, if ever, the widow may be con-
I. See ALA. CODE tit. 7, §§ 661-705 (1960); ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.30.120-.140 (1962); 
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-513, -515 to -516 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2501 (Supp. 
1963); CAL. PROB, CODE §§ 680-82; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 152-12-16 (1953); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-250 (Supp. 1964); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2307 (1953), as 
amended, DEL. CoDE ANN. § 2307 (Supp. 1962); FLA. STAT. § 733.20(l)(d) (1964); 
GA. CODE ANN. § ll3-1002 (Supp. 1963); HAWAII REv. LAws § 317-21 (1955); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. §§ 15-501, -503 to -505 (1947) ; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 178, 180-82 (1963); 
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 6-402 to -403 (1953), as amended, !ND. ANN. STAT, § 6-402 (Supp. 
1964); IOWA CODE §§ 633.374-.375 (1963); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-403 (1949); KY. 
REv. STAT. § 391.030 (1962); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2382, 3252 (West 1952); LA. CoDE 
CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 3321 (1961); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 156, §§ 17, 19 (1954); MD, 
ANN. CODE art. 93, §§ 336-37 (1957): MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 196, § 2 (1955); MICH. COMP. 
LAws § 702.68 (Supp. 1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.15 (Supp. 1964); Miss. CODE ANN. 
§§ 561, 564 (1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.260 (Supp. 1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.300 
(1956); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 91-2404 to -2405 (1964); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-103 
(1956); NEV. REv. STAT.§§ 146.010, 146.030-.040 (1963); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN, §§ 560:1-:2 
(1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3A:8-6 to -7 (1953); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-4-1 (1953); N.Y. 
SuRR. CT. ACT § 200; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 30-15 to -31 (1950), as amended, N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §§ 30-15 to -30 (Supp. 1963) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-16-10 (1960); Omo REv. 
CODE ANN. §§ 2ll7.20-.22 (Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, §§ 3ll, 314 (1961); ORE. 
REV. STAT. §§ ll6.010-.015 (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 320.2ll-.215 (1950), as 
amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.211 (Supp. 1963); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 33-10-3 
(Supp. 1964); S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-ll (1962); S.D. CODE §§ 35.1304, 35.1306 (Supp. 1960); 
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 30-801 to -807 (1955), as amended, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 30-804 
to -807 (Supp. 1964); TEX. PROB. CoDE ANN. §§ 286-87 (1956) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-8-1 
(1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 404 (Supp. 1963); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64-120 to -121 
(1950), as amended, VA. CODE ANN.§ 64-120 (Supp. 1964); WASH. REv. CODE § 11.52.040 
(1956); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4136 (1961); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 313.15(2) (1958); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 2-210 to ·211 (1957). 
2. See, e.g., CAL. PROB, CoDE §§ 680-82; MICH. COMP. LAws § 702.68 (Supp. 1956); 
N.Y. SuRR. CT. ACT § 200. 
3. See statutes cited note 1 supra. Cases illustrating the factors considered by • 
probate courts in determining the amount of an award are collected in Annot., 
90 A.L.R.2d 687 (1963) • 
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sidered as having a vested and indefeasible interest in the support 
allowance.4 
The deductibility of these allowances as a marital deduction on 
the decedent's federal estate tax return has been the subject of much 
controversy in recent years. According to section 2056 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code, the value of any interest in property which 
passes from the decedent to the surviving spouse may be deducted 
as a marital deduction from the gross estate.I• However, deductibility 
is limited in two ways: Marital deductions may not exceed fifty per 
cent of the value of the decedent's adjusted gross estate,6 and under 
the "terminable interest rule" deductions are not permitted for 
any interest passing to the surviving spouse which will fail or ter-
minate upon the happening, or failure to happen, of any event or 
contingency. 7 Since 1950, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
4. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 697 (1960); IOWA CODE § 633.374 (1963); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 525.15 (Supp. 1964); VA. CODE ANN. § 64-121 (Supp. 1964). See cases 
collected in 4 MERTENS, FEDERAL GIFT&: EsrATE TAXATION § 29.27 (Supp. 1964); Annot., 
144 A.L.R. 270 (1943). 
In several states where the statute uses words like "shall be set aside" or "is 
entitled to" to describe the widow's interest, or where a statutory minimum is provided, 
the courts have held that the surviving spouse has a vested interest in an allowance 
at the date of deceqent's death. See, e.g., In the Matter of Estate of Dillman, 8 Ill. 
App. 2d 239, 131 N.E.2d 634 (1956) (court upheld probate court's grant of $1000, 
the statutory minimum, to the estate of a husband who had died only a few hours 
after his wife); In re Croke's Estate, 155 Ohio St. 434, 99 N.E.2d 843 (1951) (court 
held that widow's estate was entitled to a full year's allowance under Ohio statute, 
even though she had lived only three months after decedent's death. See Note, 29 
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 270 (1951), which analyzes the possible interpretations of the Illinois 
statute. Although no court has expressly ruled on the nature of the allowance in 
Michigan in the situation where the widow died soon after the death of her husband, 
the court in Estate of Reynolds v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 548 (E.D. Mich. 1960), 
held that the widow has a vested right to an allowance for one year. This holding 
was criticized in Allan, The Michigan Family Allowance-Some Pertinent Questions, 
2 MICHIGAN PROBATE GUIDE FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITTONER § 3.100 (1964) , 
5. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 2056(a). See generally LoWNDES &: KRAMER, FEDERAL 
EsrATE AND GIFT TAXES §§ 17.1-.23 (2d ed. 1962); 2 BEVERIDGE, FEDERAL EsrATE TAXA-
TION §§ 14.01-.10 (1956); Polasky, Estate Tax Marital Deduction in Estate Planning, 
Tax Counselor's Q., June 1959, p. I. 
6. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 2056(c). 
In community property states, generally the husband and wife each own one-half 
of the community property. At death, therefore, only that party's half interest is 
considered part of his estate. By allowing a deduction of up to fifty per cent of the 
adjusted gross estate for any interest passing to the surviving spouse and by restricting 
the use of this deduction in community property states, the marital deduction permits 
the taxpayer in a common-law state to reduce his taxable estate to the approximate 
level it would have been had he lived in a community property state. See INT. REv. 
CoDE OF 1954, § 2056(c)(2) (B)-(C). 
Varying views have been expressed on the feasibility and desirability of the 
intended equalization. See, e.g., United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. ll8, 128 (1963); S. REP. 
No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 28 (1948); H.R. REP. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 
2d Sess. 75 (1948); Lowe, Marital Deduction-Terminable Interests-Missouri Law, 
29 Mo. L. REv. 13 (1964); Polasky, supra note 5, at 3. 
7. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b): 
"(I) GENERAL RuLE.-Where, on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an 
event or contingency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to occur, an 
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has regularly disallowed deductions for widows' allowances, claiming 
they are terminable interests. The courts, in reviewing the Com-
missioner's rulings, have consequently been faced with the problem 
of ascertaining the proper time at which the terminability of the 
widow's allowance should be measured. Conflicting solutions to this 
problem have produced the incongruous result of allowances being 
declared deductible in some cases but not in others, even when 
similar state statutes are involved. 8 
Three different approaches-time-of-payment, date-of-decree, 
and date-of-death-have been utilized by the courts to determine 
the time at which a widow's award must be vested and indefeasible 
in order to avoid the stricture of the terminable interest rule. The 
one used least by the courts, although it would almost always result 
in the deductibility of the allowance, is the time-of-payment ap-
proa~h. 9 Under ·this theory, examination of terminability does not 
occur until the widow actually receives each payment. Advocates 
of this approach argue that the interest cannot be categorized prior 
to the time of payment because no interest passes to the widow 
prior to that time.10 This argument, however, is difficult to main-
interest passing to the surviving spouse will terminate or fail, co deduction shall 
be allowed under this section with respect to such interest-
"(A) if an interest in such property passes or has passed (for less than an 
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth) from the decedent 
to any person other than such surviving spouse (or the estate of such spouse); and 
"(B) if by reason of such passing such person (or his heirs or assigns) may 
possess or enjoy any part of such property after such termination or failure of 
the interest so passing to the surviving spouse; and no deduction shall be allowed 
with respect to such interest (even if such deduction is not disallowed under 
subparagraphs (A) and (B))-
"(C) if such interest 1s to be acquired for the surviving spouse, pursuant to 
directions of the decedent, by his executor or by the trustee of a trust." 
See generally 2 BEVERIDGE, op. cit. supra note 5, § 14.02; LOWNDES & KRAMER, op. cit. 
supra note 5, §§ 17.9-.23. 
The essential purpose of the terminable interest rule is to assure that the value 
of the property interest which passes to the surviving spouse, for which a deduction 
is claimed, will be included in the estate of that survivor. See Proctor D. Rensenhouse, 
31 T.C. 818, 828 (1959) (concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part, opinion); S. REP. 
No. 1013, supra note 6, at 28; Bush, Widow's Exemption or Allowance and the Marital 
Deduction, N.Y.U. 22D INsr. ON FED. TAX, 1131, 1135 (1964); Luxemburger &: Durrett, 
How To Use Widows' Statutory Awards To Recover "Overlooked" Marital Deduction, 
20 J. TAXATION 34, 35-36 (1964). 
S. Compare Estate of Cunha v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. 
denied, 364 U.S. 942 (1961), with King v. Wiseman, 147 F. Supp. 156 (W.D. Okla. 
1956). See also Proctor D. Rensenhouse, supra note 7, at 825-26. 
9. Some lower federal courts have adopted this approach. See, e.g., Shafer v. 
United States, 60-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 'f 11949 (S.D. Iowa 1960), rev'd per curiam, 293 F.2d 
629 (8th Cir. 1961); Quivey v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 433 (D. Neb. 1959), rev'd, 
292 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1961). An examination at this time would always reveal the 
interest to be then nonterminable and vested unless it were subject to an unusual 
condition subsequent. 
10. See, e.g., Shafer v. United States, supra note 9; Quivey v. United States, supra 
note 9, at 439; Proctor D. Rensenhouse, 31 T.C. 818, 828 (1959) (concurring, in part, 
and dissenting, in part, opinion). 
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tain. It is more accurate to recognize that the widow receives her 
interest in an allowance from the statute at the time of her husband's 
death, or at least from the probate court when it determines the size 
of her allowance, rather than later when her interest is satisfied by 
actual payment. 
A second approach, one which has attracted considerable judicial 
support, is to determine terminability. at the time of the probate 
court decree.11 Use of the date-of-decree approach would allow de-
ductions in those states where the support award is vested and inde-
feasible once ordered, even though it is contingent prior to the order. 
Unlike the date-of-death rule, this approach would permit deduc-
tions for allowances in states which make the widow's award con-
tingent upon her filing an application for it, and in those states 
which terminate the widow's rights if she dies or remarries it 
would permit deductions for payments decreed retroactively for 
the widow's support between her husband's death and the allow-
ance decree. However, as with the time-of-payment approach, 
characterization of the interest only at the date of the court 
order ignores the fact that the widow had an interest prior to 
the date of the decree and it merely applying to the court to have 
the amount of that interest ascertained. In addition, the date-of-
decree approach is unfair in that the size of the deduction may be 
dependent upon when the widow elects to apply for the award.12 
For example, in a state in which the widow must survive in order 
to retain her interest, a widow who requires funds for sustenance 
and must apply for the award immediately after the decedent's 
death will not get a deduction. On the other hand, a widow who 
can afford to wait and apply later will be permitted to take a deduc-
tion for retroactive payments decreed for the period between her 
husband's death and the decree. 
The third approach, which characterizes the interest as of the 
date of the decedent's death, was recently adopted by the United 
States Supreme Court in Jackson v. United States.13 The Jackson 
case dealt with the deductibility of a widow's allowance awarded 
by a California probate court fourteen months after the death of 
petitioner's husband. Petitioner urged the Court to adopt the date-
of-decree approach, which would have allowed a deduction for all 
11. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'! Bank 8e Trust Co., 297 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 
1961); Molner v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 271 (N.D. Ill. 1959); Michael G. Rudnick, 
36 T.C. 1021 (1961); Margaret R. Gale, 35 T.C. 215 (1960). 
12. See Note, Deductibility of the Widow's Allowance Under the Marital Deduc-
tion, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1188, 1198 (1961). 
13. 376 U.S. 503 (1964). Mr. Justice Douglas dissented without opinion. The date 
of death approach was also used in Estate of Darby v. Wiseman, 323 F.2d 792 (10th 
Cir. 1963); United States v. Quivey, 292 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1961); Estate of Cunha v. 
Commissioner, 279 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 942 (1961); United 
States Nat'l Bank v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 332 (D. Ore. 1960) . 
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payments decreed for the fourteen-month period between the 
husband's death and the decree. Insisting that the date-of-death 
approach should be adopted, the Government relied on California 
decisions holding that widows' allowances abate upon the death or 
remarriage of the widow14 and argued that even though the widow 
in Jackson had survived unmarried to the date of the decree, as of 
the date of death there was a possibility of her death or remarriage. 
Since the widow's right to payments would have been defeated had 
this possibility occurred, the Government concluded that her in-
terest was terminable.15 
In support of its adoption of the date-of-death approach, the 
,court placed heavy emphasis on the Senate Committee report 
accompanying the Revenue Act of 1948, which expressly states that 
in determining whether an interest in property is terminable, the 
situation must be viewed as of the date 'of the decedent's death.16 
The Court also relied upon analogies to cases that have denied 
marital deductions for interests which were conditioned on the 
widow's surviving the date of settlement17 and for interests which 
were limited in the case of her subsequent incapacity.18 In addition, 
implicit in the Court's decision is the recognition that some interest 
in the widow's allowance passes to the widow at the time of her 
husband's death. Since the critical factor in applying the terminable 
interest rule is the possibility of failure of the interest rather than 
actual failure,19 this interest should be classified when it passes 
and the date-of-death rule should be applied. 
Under present law, the Jackson case was correctly decided. 
However, its adoption of the date-of-death approach will eliminate 
almost all deductions for widows' allowances.20 In nearly every state 
these allowances, at the time of the husband's death, are subject to 
a number of contingencies, each of which may render the interest 
terminable. For example, a number of statutes provide for failure 
of the widow's interest upon her death or remarriage, and, in 
many states, the widow must specifically apply for the award and 
her failure to do so defeats it.21 Only two states presently provide for 
14. See, e.g., Estate of Blair,.42 Cal. 2d 728, 269 P.2d 612 (1954); In the Matter of 
Estate of Hamilton, 66 Cal. 576, 6 Pac. 493 (1885). 
15. Brief for Respondent, pp. 16-17, Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964). 
16. Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503, 508 (1964); S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 10 (1948). 
17. See, e.g., Bookwalter v. Lamar, 323 F.2d 664 (8th Cir. 1963); United States v. 
Mappes, 318 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1963). 
18. See, e.g., Starrett v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1955). 
19. See statute cited note 7 supra. See, e.g., Estate of Darby v. Wiseman, 323 F.2d 
792 (10th Cir. 1963); Kasper v. Kellar, 217 F.2d 744, 746 (8th Cir. 1954); 4 MERTENS, 
op. cit. supra note 4, § 29.23, at 517 (1959). 
20. See William A. Landers, 38 T.C. 828, 836 (1962) . 
21. In United States Nat'! Bank v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 332, 337-38 (D. Ore. 
1960), the court held that the requirement that the widow apply for the allowance 
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specific amounts to be set aside unconditionally at death for the 
support of the widow.22 In several other states there are statutory 
provisions for review of the awards at a later time by the probate 
judge.28 Under these provisions, it would appear that there is no 
certainty, as of the date of death, that any appreciable allowance 
will actually be paid even in those states where the statutes or 
cases indicate that there is a vested right in the widow at death.24 
Seemingly, this uncertainty would indicate terminability. Even in 
states where there is a statutory minimum award, the provision for 
review would seem to preclude a deduction of more than this mini-
mum, if the situation is viewed at the date of death.25 In most of 
the remaining states the probate judge has some discretion in 
determining amounts which are reasonably necessary for the main-
tenance of the surviving spouse. As of the date of death, therefore, 
the widow's exact interest is unknown and terminable. 
In order to make widows' allowances deductible, state statutes 
could be amended so that the awards would vest absolutely on the 
date of death.26 However, by so doing, many state legislatures would 
be destroying the flexibility which presently permits a probate 
court to mold its decree to meet the changing needs of the widow. 
Therefore, if deductibility is to be restored, the Internal Revenue 
Code rather than the state support statutes should be amended. 
An examination of the history of the tax treatment of widows' 
allowances indicates a continuing congressional intent to permit 
was one factor indicating terminability. However, such an argument was rejected by 
the court in Proctor D. Rensenhouse, 31 T.C. 818 (1959). 
It has been contended that the date-of-death rule could eliminate deductions for 
other elective rights such as dower. See Bush, supra note 7, at 1146-47. 
22. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-403 (1949); MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, §§ 336-37 (1957). 
23. Some states allow either an increase or decrease in the award as the situation 
requires. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 180 (1963); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2117.22 
(Page 1954). Other states allow increases only. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-515 
(1956); IOWA CODE § 633.375 (1963). 
24. See note 4 supra. The court in In re Croke's Estate, 155 Ohio St. 434, 99 N.E.2d 
843 (1951), although holding the widow's allowance to be vested at decedent's death, 
acknowledged that in a proper case the award could be decreased. 
25. Statutes providing for minimum awards include ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2501 
(Supp. 1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1002 (Supp. 1963); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 178 
(1963). 
In Molner v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 271 (N.D. Ill. 1959), the court ruled that 
the provision for review of the award did not affect the vested nature of a $25,000 
allowance, although in Illinois the minimum award is $1000. However, the court's 
authority, Hodson v. Hodson, 277 Ill. 137, 115 N.E. 159 (1917), held only that the 
petition for reduction in that case was not filed within a reasonable time after the 
initial grant of the award. Thus, there is a possibility in Illinois that a large award 
may be decreased to the minimum upon timely application. This would seem to 
make the holding in Molner questionable. 
26. The official comments accompanying IowA CODE § 633.374 indicate that the 
insertion of the sentence "such allowance to the surviving spouse shall not abate 
upon .•• death or remarriage of such spouse" was made specifically to qualify the 
allowance for a marital deduction. 
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deductions for these awards. Section 812(b)(5) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1939 permitted widows' allowances to be deducted as 
an expense to the estate.27 In 1948, while retaining section 812(b)(5), 
Congress added the marital deduction and terminable interest 
provision to the Code.28 The Senate Report accompanying the 
Revenue Act of 1948 indicated that widows' allowances were not 
deductible under the marital deduction provision.29 Since section 
812(b)(5) was still in effect, it would appear that the Senate Report 
was aimed at preventing a double deduction. When section 812(b)(5) 
was repealed by the Revenue Act of 1950,30 the congressional re-
ports stated that widows' support allowances would henceforth be 
deductible under the recently enacted marital deduction section, 
subject to the "conditions and limitations" therein.31 Subsequent 
attempts to provide more clearly for the deductibility of widows' 
allowances were defeated. In 1954, opponents of proposed changes 
persuaded their colleagues that these changes might have the un-
desirable effect of endangering rather than assuring the deduc-
tibility of the allowance. 32 Five years later another proposal was 
introduced, but after passage by the House it was never reported 
out of the Senate Committee on Finance.33 The award of a widow's 
allowance is essentially beyond the control of the decedent. Because 
of this similarity to other estate expenses, Congress has consistently 
considered that some type of deduction should be allowed for 
estate assets expended in such a manner. However, since the deci-
sion in Jackson, it can no longer be said that widows' support allow-
ances will be deductible without action on the part of Congress. 
The proper guideline for a future amendment to the marital 
deduction section would appear to be that of the unsuccessful 
House bill of 1959.34 Under its provisions any amounts paid to the 
27. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 812(b)(5), 53 Stat. 123. 
28. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 812(e) (3) (now INT. REv. Com;; OF 1954, § 2056). 
29. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 3 (1948). 
30. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 502, 64 Stat. 962. The repeal was prompted 
by excessive deductions in states where liberal allowances were granted. See S. REP. 
No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 57-58 (1950). 
31. See S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 2319, 
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 136 (1950). 
Since the major cause for repeal of § 812 (b) (5) was the liberality of the allowances 
being granted, it would seem that coverage by the fifty per cent ceiling for marital 
deductions was the "condition and limitation" primarily intended. 
32. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 91-92, A319 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1954). 
33. See H.R. 2573, 86th Cong., bt Sess. (1959); H.R. REP. No. 818, 86th Cong., 
1st Sess. 1-5 (1959). See note 34 infra. 
34. H.R. 2573, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (Proposed additions to this previously 
unsuccessful amendment proposal are included in brackets.) : 
Section 2056(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to limitation in the 
case of life estate or other terminable interest) is amended by adding at the end 
thereof the following new paragraph: 
"(7) ALLOWANCE OR AWARD ro SURVIVING SPOUSE.-For purposes of ithis sub-
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surviving spouse, or that spouse's estate, within fifteen months from 
the date of death would be exempt from the operation of the 
terminable interest rule. It would appear that this amendment 
could be strengthened by also exempting those awards which are 
indefeasibly vested in the widow within that time period. In 
this manner, those allowances which have been ordered and which 
are not subject to modification, but which have not been paid for 
some reason, will also be deductible. 
Under an amendment of the type proposed, allowances would 
continue to be controlled by the fifty per cent limitation.35 Thus, 
only amounts of awards which fill the gap between other qualified 
bequests to the widow and the fifty per cent ceiling would be de-
ductible and the amount an estate could save in taxes through a 
generous court award would still be limited. In addition, a con-
siderable degree of administrative convenience would be achieved 
by limiting the exempt awards to those paid or indefeasibly vested 
within fifteen months, the required date for filing the estate tax 
retum.86 With the fifteen-month limitation, a definite and readily 
ascertainable amount could be entered as a marital deduction for 
the widow's allowance, thus eliminating the necessity for amending 
the return. Since most awards are either paid or indefeasibly vested 
within fifteen months,87 the time limit would not seriously curtail 
deductibility and would not unduly restrict the states' ability to 
retain flexible support statutes without denying a tax benefit to 
the estate. Furthermore, the proposal would, in some measure, 
equalize the deductibility of widows' allowances among the states 
section, an allowance or award made after the decedent's death pursuant to local 
law for the support of the surviving spouse during the settlement of the decedent's 
estate, shall not be considered as an interest which will terminate or fail to 
the extent that the allowance or award is in fact paid to •the surviving spouse, 
or to the estate of such spouse, [or to the extent to which a vested and indefeasible 
right to a specific amount has accrued to the surviving spouse,] within 15 months 
after the date of the decedent's death." 
The underlying reasons for the proposed amendment are discussed in H.R. REP. 
No. 818, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1959). 
A similar proposal made by the American Bar Association in 1959 inserted 
"reasonable" to modify "allowance or award," and it did not have any time limit. 
See American Bar Ass'n, Section of Taxation, Program and Committee Reports to 
be Presented at the Twentieth Annual Meeting 55-56, Aug. 1959. The use of reason-
ableness seems to conform to the unofficial criterion now being used by tax examiners 
in disallowing deductions. See Mahon, The Widow's Allowance and the Federal Tax 
Laws, 41 TAXES 692, 694-95 (1963). However, it would appear that the addition of a 
reasonableness requirement would create more problems than it would solve. Adequate 
protection against excessive awards is presently afforded by the fifty per cent limitation, 
and addition of the term reasonable would tend to encourage litigation in an attempt 
to determine its precise meaning. 
For another proposed amendment, see H.R. 10591, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 60 (1960). 
35. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954-, § 2056 (c). 
36. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6075(a). 
37. See H.R. REP. No. 818, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959). 
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since exemption from the terminable interest rule would negate 
much of the impact of the diversities in the state laws on these 
deductions. 
The Jackson decision should serve to alert Congress to the 
necessity for clarifying legislation in this area. Seemingly, an amend-
ment of the type proposed would most effectively further the long-
standing congressional policy of permitting deductions for widows' 
allowances, while permitting states to retain their present support 
standing congressional policy of permitting deductions for widows' 
needs of the surviving spouse. 
